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NOTE
TOO QUICK ON THE TRIGGER: HOW THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S
REVIEW OF REGULATORY TAKINGS IN MARYLAND SHALL
ISSUE, INC. V. HOGAN FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
COMPLEXITIES OF TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
MARIE A. BAUER *
“Jason Aldean was several songs into his set when we heard some
really loud noises. I remember one of my friends said fireworks.
The next thing I knew, it felt like there was an explosion in my face
and that my face was on fire. It kind of just hit me: Okay, you’ve
been shot in the face, and there’s still gunshots going on. This isn’t
over. We got down on the ground. It was chaos, 22,000 people
crying and screaming, not knowing what to do.” 1
The deadliest mass shooting in American history took place at the Route
91 Harvest music festival in Las Vegas, Nevada on October 1, 2017. 2 A lone
gunman sprayed bullets from the 32nd floor of the Mandalay Bay Resort and
Casino into a crowd of 22,000 concertgoers. 3 The gunman singlehandedly
fired over 1,100 rounds of ammunition, killing fifty-eight people and injuring
more than 800. 4 The shooting lasted just ten minutes. 5
For much of the American public, this was the first time they learned of
the existence of a particular firearm accessory—the bump stock. 6 A bump
stock is a device that can be attached to semiautomatic rifles, which shoot
one bullet per trigger-pull, to increase the firing rate. 7 The Las Vegas shooter
©2021 Marie A. Bauer
*J.D. Candidate, 2022, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.
1. Anna Silman, Before and After Route 91, CUT (Oct. 1, 2018),
https://www.thecut.com/2018/10/las-vegas-shooting-year-anniversary-a-survivors-story.html.
2. Deadliest Mass Shootings in the US Fast Facts, CNN (Apr. 14, 2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/19/us/mass-shootings-fast-facts.
3. Id.
4. Gunman Opens Fire on Las Vegas Concert Crowd, Wounding Hundreds and Killing 58,
HISTORY (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/2017-las-vegas-shooting.
5. Id.
6. Martin Kaste, The Politics of Bump Stocks, 1 Year After Las Vegas Shooting, NPR (Sept.
26, 2018, 5:14 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/26/650454299/the-politics-of-bump-stocks-oneyear-after-las-vegas-shooting.
7. Id.
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used rifles equipped with legally-owned bump stocks, enabling him to do
more damage in less time. 8 Following the shooting, the public and elected
officials called for bump stocks and similar devices, such as rapid fire trigger
activators, to be banned nationwide. 9 As lawmakers began looking into
changing firearms regulations, Gun Owners of America released a statement
pledging its support for the “half a million bump stock owners [who] will
have the difficult decision of either destroying or surrendering their valuable
property.” 10
In Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. v. Hogan, 11 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether a statute that deprived
property owners of the right to possess, manufacture, sell, purchase, transfer,
transport in-state, or receive a rapid fire gun trigger activator device was a
“taking” requiring just compensation under the United States Constitution’s
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. 12 The court held that the statute was not
a taking because it did not involve direct physical appropriation of personal
property by the government. 13 The court myopically decided the case,
relying on a wholly literal interpretation of the statute instead of analyzing
the statute’s impact on property rights under the conceptual framework
frequently used by the Supreme Court. 14 By summarily dismissing the
appellants’ arguments, the majority disregarded the Supreme Court’s
complex regulatory takings precedent. 15
The starkly different approaches employed by the majority and
dissenting opinions in Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. showcase the
inconsistencies in Takings Clause precedent. 16 By performing an incomplete
analysis, the majority missed an opportunity to draw attention to the need for
the Supreme Court to revisit this area of law. 17 The Supreme Court must
address two questions confounding its takings jurisprudence: (1) whether real
and personal property should be treated differently under the Takings Clause;
and (2) whether the creation of categorical tests is an effective means of
analyzing regulatory takings cases. 18
8. Id.
9. Md. Shall Issue v. Hogan, 353 F. Supp. 3d 400, 404 (D. Md. 2018), aff’d, 963 F.3d 356,
359 (4th Cir. 2020).
10. Gun Owners of America to File Suit Against Arbitrarily ATF Bump Stock Ban, GOA (Dec.
18, 2018), https://www.gunowners.org/gun-owners-of-america-to-file-suit-against-atf-bumpstock-ban/.
11. 963 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2020).
12. Id. at 365.
13. Id.
14. See infra Section IV.A.
15. See infra Sections II–III.
16. See infra Section IV.A.
17. See infra Section IV.A.
18. See infra Section IV.B.
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As to the first issue, the Court should hold that real property and
personal property must be given equal consideration under the Takings
Clause. 19 As to the second issue, the Court should reconsider its use of
categorical takings classifications and instead rely on a multi-factor test that
can account for the myriad of elements frequently encountered in modern
takings cases. 20 If the Supreme Court clarifies its takings jurisprudence,
cases like Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. could be decided by lower courts more
consistently. 21
I.

THE CASE

On April 24, 2018, Maryland Governor Lawrence Hogan signed Senate
Bill 707 (“SB-707”) into law. 22 SB-707 made it illegal, starting October 1,
2018, for any person to “manufacture, possess, sell, offer to sell, transfer,
purchase, or receive a rapid fire trigger activator” or to “transport” such a
device into the State of Maryland. 23 The statute defined “rapid fire trigger
activator” as “any device . . . constructed so that, when installed in or
attached to a firearm: the rate at which the trigger is activated increases; or
the rate of fire increases.” 24 Proponents of banning rapid fire trigger
activators stated that such devices “turn legal weapons into machineguns” 25
and “mak[e] a semi-automatic weapon into an automatic weapon.” 26
An exception clause purported to allow pre-existing owners to continue
to possess a “rapid fire trigger activator” if they applied and received
authorization to possess the device from the United States Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) before October 1, 2018. 27 On
the day SB-707 went into effect, the ATF released an advisory statement
19. See infra Section IV.B.1.
20. See infra Section IV.B.2.
21. See infra Section IV.C.
22. Md. Shall Issue, Inc. v. Hogan, 963 F.3d 356, 359 (4th Cir. 2020).
23. Id.; MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-305.1 (West 2021).
24. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW. § 4-301(m)(1)–(2) (West 2021) (including in the definition
of rapid fire trigger activator “a bump stock, trigger crank, hellfire trigger, binary trigger system,
burst trigger system, or a copy or a similar device, regardless of the producer or manufacturer”); see
also Bump-Stock-Type Devices, 83 Fed. Reg. 66,515, 66,534 (Dec. 26, 2018) (describing a “bumpstock-device” as effectively converting a semiautomatic firearm into a machine gun by “harnessing
the recoil energy of the semiautomatic firearm” in a manner which allows the trigger to reset and
continue firing without additional trigger manipulation by the shooter).
25. Md. Shall Issue v. Hogan, 353 F. Supp. 3d 400, 404 (D. Md. 2018), aff’d, 963 F.3d 356,
359 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Application of the Definition of Machinegun to “Bump Fire” Stocks
and Other Similar Devices, 83 Fed. Reg 37, at 7949 (Feb. 20, 2018)); see also id. at 404 (“In crafting
the law, legislators expressed concern about mass shootings, the lethality of firearms equipped with
bump-stock-type devices, their unregulated status, and the danger to public safety.”).
26. Id. at 404–05 (quoting Testimony of Sen. Victor R. Ramirez in Support of SB-707 at 2, S.
Judicial Proceedings Comm., 2018 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018)).
27. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 360.
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explaining that the agency was “without legal authority to accept and process
[the exception] application,” and that any such application it received from a
Maryland resident would be “returned to the applicant without action.” 28
In response to SB-707, Maryland Shall Issue (“MSI”), a non-profit gun
owners’ rights group, and four of its members filed a putative class action
against Hogan in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland. 29 MSI alleged that the government must pay just compensation
because SB-707 was a per se taking under the United States Constitution’s
Takings Clause. 30 Hogan moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state
a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 31
After a hearing, the district court granted Hogan’s motion with respect
to all counts in MSI’s complaint. 32 The district court stated that SB-707 was
not a per se taking under any theory previously recognized by the Supreme
Court because the devices were personal property, and the ban did not involve
direct physical appropriation of the property. 33 The court characterized SB707 as a “legitimate exercise of the state’s traditional police power,” and
“consistent with the long history of state laws that criminalize, ban, or
otherwise restrict items deemed hazardous.” 34 MSI appealed the dismissal
of its complaint to the Fourth Circuit.35
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Takings Clause addresses
instances when the government may interfere with private property rights
without paying compensation. 36 The regulatory takings doctrine arose from
this jurisprudence and is implicated when a property owner asserts that a
28. Id. at 360; see also id. at 369 (Richardson, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (“The ATF, a federal agency, lacks the authority to assess applications for the
State of Maryland.”).
29. Id. at 369.
30. Md. Shall Issue, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 407–08 (enumerating that MSI alleged three additional
theories of relief in its complaint which will not be addressed in this Note: that SB-707
retrospectively revoked vested property rights in violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights; that SB-707 was unconstitutionally vague; and that ATF’s refusal to process applications
for continued possession of the devices imposed a “legally impossible condition precedent”); see
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”); see also United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984) (stating that
“just compensation,” in the context of Takings Clause cases, generally equals “the market value of
the [taken] property at the time of the taking”).
31. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 360; FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
32. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 360.
33. Md. Shall Issue, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 413–14.
34. Id. at 408–09.
35. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 360.
36. Id. at 364.
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government regulation has improperly infringed on private property rights. 37
The Court has struggled to delineate between a compensable regulatory
taking versus an exercise of the government’s police power, which requires
no compensation. 38 Additionally, the nature of the property subject to
regulation, whether real or personal, may impact the Court’s rulings. 39
Section II.A examines the Supreme Court’s interpretations and application
of the Takings Clause involving regulatory takings. 40 Section II.B discusses
the differential treatment of takings involving real property versus takings
involving personal property. 41
A. The United States Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the
Regulatory Takings Doctrine
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution prohibits the taking of private property for public use. 42 Before
the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Takings Clause only
applied to federal takings of private property. 43 In 1897, however, the Court
held that the Takings Clause bound the states as well. 44 Originally, the Court
interpreted the Takings Clause to apply only to actual, physical government
occupation of property. 45 However, in the beginning of the twentieth century,
the Court recognized that a property-use regulation could also require
compensation under the Takings Clause. 46 The regulatory takings doctrine
arose from this application of the Takings Clause, attempting to define the
boundary between a valid exercise of the government’s police power and a
taking that requires just compensation. 47
The Court has historically avoided creating explicit rules that define
when a regulation is a taking and when it is not. 48 The Court first addressed
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2015).
40. See infra Section II.A.
41. See infra Section II.B.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”).
43. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 116 U.S. 226, 226 (1897).
44. Id. (holding that the takings provisions of the Fifth Amendment were incorporated by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus were binding on the states).
45. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 43 S. Ct. 158, 159–60 (1922).
46. Id. at 160.
47. Id.
48. Id.; see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 2659 (1978) (quoting
United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 78 S. Ct. 1097, 1104 (1958)) (“[W]hether a particular
restriction will be rendered invalid by the government’s failure to pay for any losses proximately
caused by it depends largely ‘upon the particular circumstances [in that] case.’”); see also Horne v.
Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2437 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Our Takings Clause
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the concept of regulations as takings in Pennsylvania Coal Company v.
Mahon, 49 stating that the distinction was a “question of degree[s].” 50 In
Mahon, the Court held that a Pennsylvania statue requiring coal companies
to leave pillars of coal in place to prevent the subsidence of surface soil was
a taking. 51 The Court stated, “the general rule . . . is that while property may
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking.” 52 Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, identified several
“fact[s] for consideration” when determining whether a regulation “goes too
far.” 53 Courts should consider whether the regulation “destroy[s] previously
existing rights of property and contract,” and whether the regulation
decreases the value of the property. 54 The Court failed, however, to define
the exact amount of loss in value that would invoke the Takings Clause. 55
The Court would not establish its first standard of analysis for when a
government regulation “goes too far” until more than fifty years later, in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 56 In Penn Central, the Court
held that a historic preservation regulation that blocked a railroad’s request
to build an addition on top of an existing historic landmark was a police
measure and did not require any compensation. 57 The Court again
emphasized that the evaluation of regulatory takings cases is an “essentially
ad hoc, factual inquir[y].” 58 A multi-factor balancing test emerged,
commonly known as the Penn Central test, outlining factors to be considered
when determining whether a regulation is a taking. 59 The factors considered
include diminution in value, interference with investment-backed
expectations, and the character of the government action. 60 As in Mahon, the
Court stated in Penn Central that diminution in value was relevant, but did
not define the loss in value required to effect a taking. 61
jurisprudence has generally eschewed ‘magic formula[s]’ and has ‘recognized few invariable
rules.’”).
49. 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922).
50. Id. at 160.
51. Id.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 159–60.
54. Id. at 159.
55. Id. (“When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an exercise
of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.”).
56. 98 S. Ct. 2646, 2659 (1978); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 43 S. Ct. 158, 160 (1922).
57. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 98 S. Ct. at 2666.
58. Id. at 2659.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2663 (stating that the Court has “reject[ed] the proposition that diminution in property
value, standing alone, can establish a ‘taking’” and noting that the Court has failed to find
compensable takings even in situations where up to 87.5% of the value of the property was lost).
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Following establishment of the “ad hoc” Penn Central test, the Court
outlined two categorical exceptions to this multi-factor approach. 62 In
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 63 the Court held that when
a government regulation results in a permanent physical occupation of real
property, the regulation is always a taking. 64 In Loretto, a New York law
required that landlords permit cable television companies to install and
maintain certain facilities on the landlord’s property. 65 A landlord purchased
a building and later discovered cable wires installed on the premises.66
Because the New York law barred removal of the wires, the landlord filed
suit, alleging a violation of the Takings Clause. 67
Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall referenced the concept of
property as a “bundle of rights.” 68 If the government takes a single strand
from the bundle, the Penn Central approach applies, but if the government
“chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand,” then the
categorical rule applies. 69 Justice Blackmun, writing in dissent, stated that
the wires allowed tenants to have access to cable television, therefore the
rental and resale value were likely increased.70 He pointed out that the
majority disregarded the fact that the permanent physical occupation did not
“diminish” the value of the property, but in fact likely increased the resale
value. 71
In contrast to the Loretto Court’s disregard of loss in value, the Court in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 72 elevated loss in value to be the
deciding factor in a new categorical exception. 73 The Lucas Court held that
regulations that made land “valueless” or denied “all economically beneficial
or productive use of land” were categorically takings and would not be
subject to the Penn Central multi-factor test. 74 With these two categorical
approaches, the Supreme Court did not overrule the Penn Central test, but
created narrow exceptions. 75

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–28 (2015).
102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982).
Id. at 3171.
Id. at 3168.
Id. at 3170.
Id.
Id. at 3175.
Id. at 3175–76.
Id. at 3185 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3182, 3185.
112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
Id. at 2902.
Id. at 2893, 2896.
Id. at 2893; Loretto, 102 S. Ct. at 3182.
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The Court further limited the exception from Lucas in Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. 76 In TahoeSierra, landowners asserted that a moratorium on development of their
properties constituted a regulatory taking. 77 The Court held otherwise,
stating that the Lucas categorical approach did not apply because the
moratorium was temporary. 78 The Court reasoned that cases involving
temporary restrictions or prohibitions or anything short of a “complete
elimination of value” or a “total loss” required a Penn Central analysis. 79
Thus, the Penn Central analysis remains the default analysis for takings
cases, with Loretto and Lucas only meant to be applied in rare instances. 80
B. The Treatment of Takings Involving Real Property
The Court applies the regulatory takings doctrine differently to real
property versus personal property. 81 In Andrus v. Allard, 82 a regulation of
endangered bird feathers in Native American artifacts was found to not be a
violation of the Takings Clause. 83 The Court stated that “government
regulation—by definition—involves the adjustment of rights for the public
good.” 84 In Andrus, the regulation did not force the owners to surrender their
property, but they were barred from selling or buying endangered bird
feathers. 85 The Court held that denial of one traditional property right did not
amount to a taking. 86
Later, in Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 87 the Court faced the
question of whether the Loretto categorical exception for permanent
government occupations of real property extended to government

76. 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002).
77. Id. at 1470.
78. Id. at 1484 (“[A] permanent deprivation of the owner’s use of the entire area is a
taking . . . whereas a temporary restriction that merely cause a diminution in value is not.”).
79. Id. at 1483.
80. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2437 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 2425 (majority opinion).
82. 100 S. Ct. 318 (1979).
83. Id. at 328; Eagle Protection Act, 50 C.F.R. § 21.2(a) (1978); Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 50
C.F.R. § 22.2(a) (1978).
84. Andrus, 100 S. Ct. at 326.
85. Id. at 327; see also id. at 323 (stating that the law forbade all “commercial transactions”
involving endangered bird feathers, even feathers obtained before the law was enacted, because any
potential for financial gain would give individuals incentive to continue killing endangered birds
for their feathers).
86. See id. at 327 (“[W]here an owner possesses a full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the
destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in
its entirety.”).
87. 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
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appropriations of personal property. 88 In Horne, California raisin producers
were fined for violating a regulation requiring that a certain amount of their
raisins be diverted into a reserve market where the raisins were sold,
allocated, or otherwise disposed of in ways that did not compete with the
commercial market.89 The Court held that a regulation limiting the number
of raisins that could be released into the commercial market was a categorical
taking. 90 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, stated that Loretto
defined permanent occupations as chopping through all sticks in the property
rights bundle, and that this reasoning is “equally applicable to a physical
appropriation of personal property.” 91 In so holding, the Court extended the
Loretto categorical exception for permanent government invasions of
property to personal property in addition to real property. 92
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. v. Hogan, 93 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland, dismissing MSI’s complaint for
failure to state a claim. 94 Judge Thacker wrote the majority opinion, joined
by Judge Floyd, holding that SB-707 was not a per se taking requiring just
compensation under the United States Constitution’s Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause. 95 Judge Richardson wrote an opinion concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part as to the takings claim, stating that
SB-707 was a “‘classic’ taking” under the Fifth Amendment. 96
Judge Thacker began by outlining two categories of cases in which the
Supreme Court had found per se regulatory takings: (1) when a regulation is
an actual “physical appropriation” as found in Loretto and (2) “‘where [a]
regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land’” as
found in Lucas. 97 Judge Thacker stated that the Supreme Court in Horne had
extended the per se category from Loretto—direct physical appropriation—

88. Id. at 2425.
89. Id. at 2424–25.
90. Id. at 2428.
91. Id. at 2427.
92. Id. at 2427–28.
93. 963 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2020).
94. Id. at 359.
95. Id. at 367; Md. Shall Issue v. Hogan, 353 F. Supp. 3d 400, 410 (D. Md. 2018), aff’d, 963
F.3d 356, 367 (4th Cir. 2020).
96. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 358, 368 (Richardson, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
97. Id. at 364–65 (majority opinion) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992)).
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to encompass takings of personal property as well as real property. 98 She
explained that the Court, however, had not extended the per se category from
Lucas—denial of all economic value—to personal property. 99 Under Lucas,
she stated, an owner of personal property “ought to be aware that new
regulation might even render his property economically worthless” because
of a “[s]tate’s traditionally high degree of control over commercial
dealings.” 100
Applying this framework to the facts of Maryland Shall Issue, Inc., the
majority held that SB-707 was not a per se taking. 101 Judge Thacker stated
that because the statute did not require owners of the rapid fire trigger
activator devices to “turn them over to the [g]overnment or to a third party,”
it did not involve “physical appropriation” of property like in Loretto and
Horne. 102 Even though SB-707 may render the rapid fire trigger activator
devices “economically worthless,” Judge Thacker explained that the per se
category from Lucas—denial of all economic value in the property—is only
applicable to real property. 103 Additionally, she reasoned that the devices’
owners must have been aware of the possibility that their personal property
may lose all value, because the devices fell into an “area[] where the [s]tate
has a ‘traditionally high degree of control.’” 104 Because SB-707 did not fall
under either of the per se regulatory takings categories outlined by the
majority, the court held that the statute was not a per se taking under the
Takings Clause. 105

98. Id. at 366 (“In Horne, the Supreme Court did hold that the first type of per se regulatory
takings identified in Loretto—direct appropriation—applies to personal property.”).
99. Id. (“Horne distinguished Lucas: ‘[w]hatever Lucas had to say about reasonable
expectations with regard to regulations, people still do not expect their property, real or personal, to
be actually occupied or taken away.’” (emphasis in original)); see also id. at 365–66 (“In the case
of land . . . we think the notion . . . that title is somehow held subject to the ‘implied limitation’ that
the State may subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent with the
historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional
culture.”).
100. Id. at 366 (quoting Holliday Amusement Co. of Charleston v. S.C., 493 F.3d 404, 410 (4th
Cir. 2007)). In Holiday Amusement Co., the Fourth Circuit held that a ban on the possession or sale
of certain lawfully acquired gambling machines was not a taking, because gambling was historically
a highly regulated area and the machine owners were aware that the state could “regulate [gambling]
minutely or . . . outlaw it completely.” Holiday Amusement Co., 493 F.3d at 410.
101. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 367.
102. Id. at 366 (emphasis omitted).
103. Id. at 367.
104. Id. (“We can think of few types of personal property that are more heavily regulated than
the types of devices that are prohibited by SB-707.”).
105. Id.
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Judge Richardson concurred in part 106 and dissented in part, stating that
SB-707 was a “classic taking” under the Supreme Court’s “classic” takings
jurisprudence. 107 He stated that a “classic taking” was originally understood
to mean “a direct appropriation of property, or the functional equivalent of a
practical ouster of the owner’s possession.” 108 Judge Richardson cautioned
against confusing a classic takings analysis with a regulatory takings
analysis. 109 He explained that a “classic taking” analysis—as opposed to a
regulatory takings analysis—treats real and personal property the same, is not
affected by a state’s police powers, and will require compensation if a taking
is found, no matter how small the economic impact. 110
Judge Richardson defined “property” as “the group of rights inherent in
the citizen’s relation to [a] physical thing,” which has also been referred to
by the Supreme Court as a “bundle of rights”—the right “to possess, use and
dispose of an item.” 111 He stated that the government commits a per se
“classic taking” when it “chop[s] through the bundle,” destroying the owner’s
property rights. 112 Applying this framework, Judge Richardson stated that
the statute amounted to a taking under the Fifth Amendment requiring just
compensation. 113
Judge Richardson stated that SB-707 expressly eliminated a rapid fire
trigger activator device owner’s property rights “to possess, transport, donate,
devise, transfer, or sell their device[].” 114 He pointed out that the statute
effectively “require[d] owners to physically dispossess themselves” of the
devices, because the exception clause was defunct. 115 This was “the
functional equivalent of a practical ouster of the owner’s possession.” 116
Because SB-707 completely removed the device owners’ property rights—

106. Id. at 370 (Richardson, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(agreeing with “the majority’s (implicit) determination that individual Plaintiffs have standing to
bring their takings claims”).
107. Id. at 368, 379.
108. Id. at 371.
109. Id. at 372 (“Whatever the role of categorical rules in the ‘more recent’ regulatory-takings
inquiry, the classic taking, ‘old as the Republic[,] . . . involves the straightforward application of
per se rules.’”).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 373, 375.
112. Id. at 375; see also id. at 374 (“[P]hysical occupation is of a special character only
because—to use the Supreme Court’s metaphor—that occupation ‘chops through the “bundle”’ of
property rights, rather than takes ‘a single “strand.’”” (emphasis omitted)).
113. Id. at 379.
114. Id. at 375.
115. Id.
116. Id.; see also id. at 377 (“Property need not be turned over to the government to effect a
classic taking. . . . Indeed, property need not physically be turned over to anyone at all—not even a
‘third party’—for a classic taking to arise.”).
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chopping through the bundle of rights—he argued that the statute is a “classic
taking” under the Fifth Amendment. 117
IV. ANALYSIS
In Maryland Shall Issue, Inc., the Fourth Circuit held that SB-707, a
Maryland statute banning rapid fire trigger activator devices, was not a taking
under the United States Constitution’s Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. 118
The reductive reasoning used by the majority failed to analyze takings
jurisprudence completely. 119 The majority limited application of the
regulatory takings doctrine to the narrow concept of direct “physical
appropriations,” instead of also exploring the concept of property as a
“bundle of rights” as outlined by the dissent. 120 The starkly different opinions
in Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. are a symptom of a larger problem: the
contradictions and inconsistencies in takings jurisprudence result in
confusion among lower courts. 121 The Supreme Court should revisit its
takings jurisprudence to clarify and simplify the area of law in two ways: (1)
by holding that real and personal property must be treated equally in all
takings cases and (2) by abandoning the use of per se categorical takings
classifications in favor of the Penn Central multi-factor test. 122
Section IV.A discusses how the majority and dissenting opinions in
Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. showcase the consequences of the Supreme
Court’s inconsistent Takings Clause jurisprudence in the lower courts. 123
Section IV.B explores why the Supreme Court should revisit and clarify two
key issues in Takings Clause precedent. 124 Section IV.B.1 discusses the first
issue—why the Supreme Court should hold that real and personal property
must be given the same weight in takings cases. 125 Section IV.B.2 discusses
the second issue—why per se categorical classifications should be abandoned
in favor of a multi-factor test that would be more adaptable to modern takings
cases. 126 Section IV.C applies the two suggested clarifications from Section
117. Id. at 378–79.
118. Id. (majority opinion).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 364; id. at 375 (Richardson, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part); see also RAYMOND T. NIMMER ET AL., INFORMATION LAW § 2:3 (2021) (“There are various
ways to define ‘property’ or ‘ownership.’ The most useful approach holds that property refers to a
bundle of rights recognized in law in reference to a particular subject matter.”).
121. Christopher E. Mills, Raisin Cane?: Takings Jurisprudence After Horne v. Department of
Agriculture, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 2 (2015).
122. See infra Section IV.B.
123. See infra Section IV.A.
124. See infra Section IV.B.
125. See infra Section IV.B.1.
126. See infra Section IV.B.2.

2021]

TOO QUICK ON THE TRIGGER

101

IV.B to the facts of Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. to show how a modified
takings jurisprudence can yield more coherent and equitable results. 127
A. The Competing Theories in Takings Clause Jurisprudence Have
Resulted in Inconsistency Among Lower Courts
While courts have reliably found takings in cases involving actual
physical appropriation of property, courts have applied the Takings Clause
less consistently when a regulation only affects property rights. 128 The
concept of property as an intangible item, a set of related interests, or a
“bundle of property rights,” appears throughout Supreme Court takings
jurisprudence, yet courts do not apply it consistently. 129 For example, if SB707 from Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. had dictated that rapid fire trigger
activator device owners must physically give their devices to a government
agency, the Fourth Circuit would have found a taking. 130 In actuality, SB707 revoked an owner’s right to possess, manufacture, sell, purchase,
transfer, transport in-state, or receive a rapid fire trigger activator device.131
Although the statute does not explicitly state that the owners must turn the
devices over, the owners are nonetheless compelled under threat of
imprisonment to “physically dispossess themselves” of the devices. 132 The
result for the device owners is the same in both instances—a total loss of
property rights—but the court’s holding varied based on the analytical
framework it used. 133
127. See infra Section IV.C.
128. Steven C. Begakis, Stop the Reach: Solving the Judicial Takings Problem by Objectively
Defining Property, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1197, 1203 (2016) (“The simplest application of the
Takings Clause involves a physical appropriation of tangible property. It involves no philosophical
speculation or conceptual line drawing—either a government has taken possession of property, or
it has not. . . . However, the doctrine of regulatory takings is not so clean cut and poses unique
conceptual challenges in its application.”).
129. Compare Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2438 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(“[W]here governmental action impacts property rights in ways that do not chop through the bundle
entirely, we have declined to apply per se rules.”), with Md. Shall Issue, Inc. v. Hogan, 963 F.3d
356, 378 (4th Cir. 2020) (“[I]t is simply incorrect that the government must destroy every stick in
the bundle of property rights to effect a taking.”), with Andrus v. Allard, 100 S. Ct. 318, 327 (1979)
(“At least where an owner possesses a full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’
of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.”).
130. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 366 (stating that SB-707 is not a taking because “SB-707
does not require owners of rapid fire trigger activators to turn them over to the Government or to a
third party”).
131. Id. at 359.
132. Id. at 375 (Richardson, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
133. Id. at 367 (majority opinion); id. at 379 (Richardson, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part); see also Mills, supra note 121, at 5 (“The use of an ends-based analysis
typically results in the taking being characterized as categorical, favoring the property owner. The
use of a means-based analysis, by contrast, typically results in a taking being characterized as
regulatory, favoring the government.”).
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The majority and dissenting opinions in Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. both
display reasonable—and opposite—conclusions stemming from Supreme
Court takings precedent, which is precisely the problem with the precedent
as it stands. 134 The Supreme Court has interpreted per se takings in both
literal and conceptual terms. 135 A literal interpretation, used by the majority
in Maryland Shall Issue, Inc., dictates that the government takes property
when it “actually” or “physically” takes the property. 136 Because the
Supreme Court did not explicitly extend the Lucas “depriv[ation] . . . of all
economically beneficial use” category to personal property, anything less
than an actual physical appropriation of personal property is not a per se
taking. 137 The rapid fire trigger devices are personal property, but because
SB-707 did not explicitly involve physical appropriation, the statute is not a
taking. 138
Using a conceptual interpretation, employed by the dissent in Maryland
Shall Issue, Inc., the Supreme Court has held that traditional “property rights
in a physical thing” are “to possess, use and dispose of it.” 139 These property
rights make up what the Court has termed a “bundle” of rights. 140 The Court
has found takings when government action “chops” through the “bundle.” 141
SB-707 chops through the device owner’s bundle of property rights because
the statute destroys the owner’s right to possess, transport, donate, devise,
transfer, or sell their devices. 142 In this way, the statute “actually and
physically defeats [the owners’] property rights”; therefore, the statute is a
taking. 143
In addition to provoking the competing opinions in Maryland Shall
Issue, Inc., Supreme Court takings jurisprudence has also led to variance

134. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 367 (majority opinion); id. at 379 (Richardson, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also André LeDuc, Twilight of the
Idols: Philosophy and the Constitutional Law of Takings, 10 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 201, 344–
45 (2019) (“[T]akings cases split the Court, not just as a matter of the outcomes that the justices
would reach but also as a matter of the reasons for the various decisions. Justices who vote together
nevertheless often disagree in their reasoning. This judicial behavior is powerful evidence that the
law is not settled and that the Court’s jurisprudence is not broadly accepted as compelling.”).
135. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 367 (majority opinion); id. at 379 (Richardson, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
136. Id. at 365–66 (majority opinion).
137. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2015); id. at 2437 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
138. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 366–67.
139. Id. at 374 (Richardson, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 375.
143. Id. at 376.
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among other lower courts. 144 In the Ninth Circuit case Duncan v. Beccera, 145
California owners of high-capacity firearms magazines filed suit against the
California Attorney General, alleging that California Penal Code Section
32310 was a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 146 The statute required that
lawful owners of firearm magazines capable of holding more than ten rounds
of ammunition “dispossess them” by removing them from the state, selling
them to a licensed firearms dealer, or surrendering them to a law enforcement
agency for destruction. 147 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of California held that the statute was a taking, noting that “California
will deprive Plaintiffs not just of the use of their property, but of possession,
one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of property rights. . . . [T]he
Takings Clause prevents [the State] from compelling the physical
dispossession of such lawfully-acquired private property without just
compensation.” 148
The variance in the application of takings jurisprudence exposes the
need for the Supreme Court to revisit this area of law. 149 In its brief, MSI
pointed out the similar facts between its case and Duncan, as well as the
analytical approach the Duncan court used for the takings issue. 150 The
United States District Court for the District of Maryland, however, dismissed
Duncan as “[a] single case in a non-controlling jurisdiction that is
inconsistent with binding authority on related legal questions.” 151 Based on
the existing precedent, it is unlikely that lower courts will conform to the
same method of analysis in regulatory takings cases:
[T]here is every reason for the Court to endeavor to develop a
unified judicial takings doctrine that could equip reviewing courts
and signal to lower state courts that sloppy or crafty opinions that
fail to accord proper respect to essential property rights, as well as
those property rights established in state law, will be at least
compensated—and, if serious enough, overturned. 152
Property rights are “a bedrock principle of . . . constitutional tradition”
and it is past time for the Supreme Court to revisit and clarify this area of

144. Id. at 379.
145. 742 F. App’x 218 (9th Cir. 2018).
146. Duncan v. Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1114 (S.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d, 742 F. App’x 218
(9th Cir. 2018).
147. Id. at 1110.
148. Id. at 1138 (alteration in original).
149. Begakis, supra note 128, at 1223.
150. Brief of Appellants at 41–42, Md. Shall Issue, Inc., v. Hogan, 963 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2020)
(No. 18-2474).
151. Md. Shall Issue v. Hogan, 353 F. Supp. 3d 400, 416 (D. Md. 2018), aff’d, 963 F.3d 356 (4th
Cir. 2020).
152. Begakis, supra note 128, at 1223.
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law. 153 Especially because, as can be seen in Maryland Shall Issue, Inc.,
property rights often intersect with another “bedrock principle” of
“constitutional tradition”—states’ broad exercise of their police powers to
protect public safety. 154
B. The Supreme Court Must Revisit its Takings Clause Jurisprudence
to Clarify the Treatment of Personal Property and Eliminate the
Use of Categorical Classifications
The inconsistencies and confusion inherent in the Supreme Court’s
takings jurisprudence can be minimized by the Court revisiting two
complications that reappear throughout Takings Clause cases. 155 First, the
Supreme Court has unreasonably developed a preference for the rights of real
property owners as opposed to the rights of personal property owners. 156
Second, the Supreme Court continued to create categorical takings
classifications even though the Penn Central multi-factor balancing test
sufficiently analyzes regulatory takings cases. 157 By eliminating these two
complications from Takings Clause jurisprudence, the Supreme Court could
provide lower courts with the coherent guidance required to analyze takings
cases. 158
1. The Supreme Court Should Hold that Real and Personal
Property Must be Given Equal Weight in Takings Cases
The preferential treatment given to real property in takings cases is not
grounded in the language or origins of the Takings Clause and has
unnecessarily complicated lower courts’ analyses. 159 The text of the Fifth
153. James W. Ely, Jr., The “Despotic Power” Reconsidered, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 319, 319
(2016); see also LeDuc, supra note 134, at 317 (“Takings Clause cases present issues about the
nature of property, fairness, the power of the state, democratic decision-making, corruption, and the
role of property in defining individual freedom and ensuring individual autonomy.”).
154. Ely, supra note 154; see also Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 367 (stating that
traditionally, the government has regulated firearms-related devices heavily, and may do so in the
interests of “the public good”); but see Harry Cheadle, A ‘Bump Stock’ Ban Would Barely Affect
(Oct.
5,
2017,
4:39
PM),
Gun
Violence
in
America,
VICE
https://www.vice.com/en/article/wjxypw/a-bump-stock-ban-would-barely-affect-gun-violence-inamerica (“Most gun violence comes in more mundane forms: domestic abuse
incidents . . . arguments between friends or strangers . . . or suicides—which make up the majority
of gun deaths. That violence generally involves handguns, rather than rifles. A bump stock ban
wouldn’t affect any of that.”).
155. See infra Sections IV.B.1–2.
156. See infra Section IV.B.1.
157. See infra Section IV.B.2.
158. See infra Section IV.C.
159. Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference for Landownership
in Regulatory Takings Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 227, 282 (2004) (“Despite the weak intellectual
foundations for a distinction between land and personal property in regulatory takings law, the
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Amendment states that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation.” 160 The language of the Fifth Amendment does
not delineate differing treatment for real “private property” as opposed to
personal “private property.” 161
The origins of the Fifth Amendment also point to a lack of foundation
for the idea that real property should be given more weight than personal
property. 162 The Takings Clause “codified the principles of Clause 28 of
Magna Carta and was intended to . . . [restrict] the instances in which
government could seize a person’s property by requiring the
government . . . to pay the person just compensation.” 163 Clause 28
specifically forbade the taking of personal property such as “corn or other
provisions” without compensation. 164 Government appropriation of personal
property during the Revolutionary War also provided a foundation for the
Fifth Amendment:
That part . . . which declares that private property shall not be taken
for public use, without just compensation, was probably intended
to restrain the arbitrary and oppressive mode of obtaining supplies
for the army, and other public uses, by impressment, as was too
frequently practised [sic] during the revolutionary war, without any
compensation whatever. 165
The text and roots of the Takings Clause indicate no preference for the
rights of real property owners over personal property owners and “[t]he
historical evidence suggesting stronger constitutional protection of land is
weak and reflects a bygone era.” 166
Judges created the idea that real property should be treated differently
than personal property, and the Supreme Court indicated in Horne that its

modern Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence undoubtedly has been characterized by favoritism
towards land.”).
160. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added); see also William Sumner Macdaniel, No
Appropriation Without Compensation: How Per Se Takings of Personal Property Check the Power
to Regulate Commerce, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 509, 521 (2017) (“Nowhere in the text of the Fifth
Amendment is it apparent the Takings Clause was intended to apply only to real property.”).
161. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
162. Macdaniel, supra note 160, at 521.
163. Id. at 513.
164. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2015).
165. 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. at 305–06 (Philadelphia, William Young Birch &
Abraham Small 1803).
166. Lynda L. Butler, The Horne Dilemma: Protecting Property’s Richness and Frontiers, 75
MD. L. REV. 787, 789 (2016).
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future decisions may break with that precedent. 167 The Supreme Court
should finish the business it started in Horne and hold that real and personal
property must be given equal consideration in all takings cases. 168 Chief
Justice Roberts, writing for the Horne majority, stated that “[t]he
Government has a categorical duty to pay just compensation when it takes
your car, just as when it takes your home. The Takings Clause provides:
‘[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.’ It protects ‘private property’ without any distinction between
different types.” 169
Yet later in the Horne opinion, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that
“[w]hatever Lucas had to say about reasonable expectations with regard to
regulations, people still do not expect their property, real or personal, to be
actually occupied or taken away.” 170 The phrase “whatever Lucas had to
say . . . with regard to regulations” introduced ambiguity and allowed the
Court to avoid addressing whether the distinction between real and personal
property should be abolished in all takings cases. 171 It is not difficult to see
how some courts could view Horne as reaffirming the disparate treatment of
real and personal property in regulatory takings, while others could view
Horne as signaling that real and personal property should be given equal
weight. 172 The Supreme Court needs to revisit Horne to finish what it
started—establishing that real and personal property should be treated
equally in all cases. 173
2. The Supreme Court Should Abandon Categorical Tests and Rely
on the Penn Central Multi-Factor Test When Analyzing Takings
Cases
The Court should rely on the Penn Central multi-factor balancing test
instead of implementing a string of categorical takings classifications.174
Takings cases are diverse and can be complicated. 175 Therefore, any analysis
167. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2427; Peñalver, supra note 159, at 233; see also Macdaniel, supra note
160, at 540 (stating that the decision in Horne was “critical to acknowledge personal and real
property equally in the eyes of the law”).
168. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2426.
169. Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
170. Id. at 2427.
171. Id.
172. Butler, supra note 166, at 795 (“The Horne decision raises more questions than it resolves.
The Court declared that personal property is as worthy as real property of protection from physical
takings, yet it left intact—and without explanation—the different treatment recognized in Lucas for
regulatory takings.”).
173. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2427.
174. Richard A. Epstein, The Unfinished Business of Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 10
N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 734, 776 (2016).
175. Butler, supra note 166, at 787.
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of such cases should be adaptable to varying circumstances. 176 Takings are
also often a question of “degree[s],” and an effective takings test should be
able to weigh relevant factors against each other.177
The Court should rely on the Penn Central test, an ad hoc factual
inquiry, to determine whether government action effects a taking, instead of
piecemeal adding categorical tests: 178
Regulatory takings claims often simultaneously implicate
questions of basic fairness, distributive justice, utility and
efficiency, an individual’s ability to rely on settled expectations in
pursuit of life plans, and society’s need to regulate private activity
for the sake of health, safety and the preservation of the
environment for future generations. These diverse considerations
suggest that it will be the rare bright line test that can consistently
do justice across a broad array of takings cases. The muchmaligned balancing test set forth in Penn Central provides the
needed flexibility. 179
Although Penn Central provides flexibility, it may also “raise[] more
questions than it answers” and “yield[s] unpredictable, sometimes wildly
inconsistent, results.” 180 But the categorical classifications have done
nothing to lessen the confusion in takings analyses, and have caused
additional problems. 181 In Loretto, which generated the first categorical
exception to the Penn Central test, Justice Blackmun pointed out another
danger of straying from the multi-factor test—“[T]he Court does not further
equity so much as it encourages litigants to manipulate their factual
allegations to gain the benefit of its per se rule.” 182 The most effective way
to streamline takings jurisprudence is for the Supreme Court to abandon the
categorical classifications and return to a sole, if imperfect, multi-factor
test. 183
176. Id. (“Both real and personal property come in many sizes, shapes, and colors. Takings
analysis should not ignore differences in the types of property.”).
177. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 43 S. Ct. 158, 160 (1922).
178. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 2659 (1978).
179. Peñalver, supra note 159, at 285–86; see also Epstein, supra note 175 (“[T]he real
institutional mystery here is this: why the deep reliance on half measures that don’t work? Part of
the reason comes from the inveterate habit of Supreme Court justices to take some minimalist
strategy as if they could break off one part of a larger whole. But that solution results in a makeshift
body of doctrine that no one in the end defends. . . . [I]t is precisely the eager avoidance of any clear
theory that leaves everything up in the air.”).
180. Luke A. Wake, Check Your Rights at the Door: Rethinking Confiscatory Regulation, 68
DRAKE L. REV. 123, 132 (2020).
181. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 102 S. Ct. 3164, 3184 (1982) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
182. Id.
183. Id. (“[H]istory teaches that takings claims are properly evaluated under a multifactor
balancing test.”).
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C. Lower Courts Would Be Able to Analyze Regulatory Takings Cases
Such as Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. More Uniformly if Takings
Jurisprudence Was Simplified
Lower courts could produce more consistent and equitable outcomes by
applying the Penn Central test instead of categorical exceptions to regulatory
takings cases and eliminating the difference in treatment between real and
personal property. 184 For example, if these two changes were implemented
in the case of Maryland Shall Issue, Inc., there would be no need to begin an
analysis by determining whether SB-707 was a per se taking. 185 The court
could immediately begin with the fact-based Penn Central test, weighing the
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, the degree of interference
with investment-back expectations, and the character of the government
action. 186
1. The Economic Impact of the Regulation
SB-707 revokes rapid fire trigger activator device owners’ right to
possess, transport, donate, devise, transfer, or sell their devices. 187 The
owners are left with a valueless item which they must “physically
dispossess.” 188 Because the Supreme Court should give equal weight to both
real and personal property when considering loss of economic value, the fact
that the devices become valueless is relevant even though they are personal
property. 189 The argument that the device owners retained the right to
transport their property out-of-state contravenes the spirit of the Takings
Clause and is not dispositive under a classic takings analysis. 190 It would be
bad policy for any court to find that a property owner could not succeed in a
state government takings claim so long as there remained at least one other
state in the country where that owner would not lose all rights to his
property. 191

184. See supra Section IV.B.
185. Begakis, supra note 128, at 1206.
186. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 2659 (1978).
187. Md. Shall Issue, Inc. v. Hogan, 963 F.3d 356, 375 (4th Cir. 2020) (Richardson, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
188. Id. (“The dispossession mandate leaves the owner with a finite list of tangible options to
effect dispossession of their rapid fire trigger activators: destroy them, trash them, abandon them,
or surrender them.”).
189. See supra Section IV.B.
190. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 378–79 (“The Fifth Amendment prohibits uncompensated
takings; it does not require flight to avoid them.”).
191. Id. at 379 (“[I]ncorporation would be hollow indeed if it provided no protection from State
power so long as one can go elsewhere to exercise his ‘rights.’”).
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Additionally, the Court found takings in Loretto and Horne, despite the
fact that the owners did not lose all of their property interests. 192 SB-707
rendered the rapid fire trigger activator devices valueless and effectively
stripped the owners of all property rights—perhaps the most severe economic
impact possible. 193
2. Interference with Investment-backed Expectations
The Fourth Circuit’s argument that owners of rapid-fire trigger devices
should have been “aware of [the] possibility” that their devices would be
made “economically worthless” fails upon perfunctory review. 194 A rational
person simply would not purchase property with the expectation that the
property would be rendered completely worthless and unusable, regardless
of whether that property was firearms-related. 195 Firearms have traditionally
been heavily regulated, but these regulations often contain “use restrictions
or registration options for existing owners” which keep them from being
considered takings. 196
For example, proponents of banning rapid fire trigger activator devices
compared the devices to machineguns, which were banned in 1986. 197
Machineguns themselves, however, were subject to a grandfather clause
when they were first banned. 198 An owner of a machinegun in 1986 may still
own that same machinegun in 2021 if the owner legally registered it before
the date of the ban’s enactment. 199 An owner of a rapid fire trigger activator
device has no such recourse because the exception clause in SB-707 is
illusory. 200

192. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 102 S. Ct. 3164, 3176 (1982) (stating
that the owner could still sell the property at issue, even if that right did not hold any value); see
also Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2423 (2015) (acknowledging that the owners still
had a contingent interest in the profits from the sale of raisins that were set aside).
193. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 375 (Richardson, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
194. Id. at 367 (majority opinion).
195. Peñalver, supra note 159, at 251 (stating that the Lucas Court’s argument that “a reasonable
owner of personal property . . . does not expect to receive compensation when regulation reduces
the value of that property to zero” is “circular because it would justify the Court’s decision not to
compensate on the basis of expectations generated in large part by the Court’s own decisions not to
compensate”).
196. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 376 (Richardson, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
197. Md. Shall Issue v. Hogan, 353 F. Supp. 3d 400, 404 (D. Md. 2018), aff’d, 963 F.3d 356,
369 (4th Cir. 2020) (Richardson, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part);
United States v. Hunter, 843 F. Supp. 235, 238 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
198. Hunter, 843 F. Supp. at 238; 18 U.S.C. § 922(o).
199. 18 U.S.C. § 922(o); United States v. Kuzma, 967 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2020).
200. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 369.
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Therefore, it is not reasonable to assume that an owner of a rapid fire
trigger activator device must have been “aware of the possibility that new
regulation might . . . render his property economically worthless,” when
machineguns, an analogous device, were historically grandfathered in. 201 At
most, an owner may have been aware that a grandfather clause would limit
the extent of his property rights in the future, not that those rights would be
abolished completely. 202 Because the Supreme Court should give the
expectations of real and personal property owners the same consideration,
the fact that the devices are personal property should not lessen the device
owners’ expectation that they would retain their property rights. 203
3. Character of the Government Action
SB-707 did not involve direct physical appropriation of the rapid fire
trigger activators, but the resulting effects of the regulation are tantamount to
physical invasion. 204 The most severe form of government intrusion is an
actual physical occupation or appropriation of real or personal property, and
SB-707 did not involve such an intrusion. 205 The statute did, however,
revoke the rapid fire trigger activator device owners’ right to possess,
transport, donate, devise, transfer, or sell their devices—in effect requiring
owners to “physically dispossess themselves” of their property. 206
Additionally, the fact that the government included an exception clause
in SB-707 shows that the government could have achieved its ends without
revoking the existing property owners’ rights to possess the rapid fire trigger
activators. 207 The exception clause from SB-707 purported to allow device
owners to continue to possess their rapid fire trigger activator devices after
enactment of the statute, but the clause was defunct.208 Because the ATF is
a federal agency, it was unable to process applications related to SB-707, a
state law, as required by the SB-707 exception clause. If the clause was
functional, allowing for the continued lawful ownership of the devices, SB-

201. Id. at 365 (majority opinion); 18 U.S.C. § 922(o); Hunter, 843 F. Supp. at 238.
202. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 376 (Richardson, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
203. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2015) (“[P]eople . . . do not expect their
property, real or personal, to be actually occupied or taken away.”).
204. Md. Shall Issue, Inc., 963 F.3d at 368 (Richardson, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 375 (“The dispossession mandate leaves the owner with a finite list of tangible options
to effect dispossession of their rapid fire trigger activators: destroy them, trash them, abandon them,
or surrender them.”).
207. Id. at 369.
208. Id.
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707 would not be a taking. 209 The exception clause shows that the State
acknowledged that it could accomplish its goal to increase public safety
without revoking the existing owners’ right to possess the devices. 210
Without a functioning exception clause, SB-707 encroaches on private
property rights more than is necessary to accomplish legitimate state
interests—the exact type of government action the Takings Clause is meant
to address. 211
The legislature aimed to use SB-707 to increase public safety—a
legitimate state interest—however, “a strong public desire to improve the
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter
cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.” 212 By analyzing
the facts of Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. using the Penn Central multi-factor
test and treating real and personal property equally, it is clear that SB-707
exceeds the state’s police power and is therefore a regulatory taking requiring
just compensation. 213
V. CONCLUSION
In Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. v. Hogan, 214 the Fourth Circuit considered
whether SB-707 was a taking requiring just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause. 215 The court held that the statute was not a
per se taking because it did not involve direct physical appropriation of
personal property by the government. 216 Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. is an
important case—not because of the facts themselves—but because of the way
the Fourth Circuit analyzed the facts. 217 The majority omitted the Supreme
Court’s competing and evolving regulatory takings precedent, which was
nonetheless addressed by the dissent. 218
The contrasting opinions in Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. showcase the
inconsistencies in takings precedent and the resulting complexity lower

209. Id. at 376.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 368, 376; see generally Mark Eichmann, Delaware’s Bump Stock Ban to Take Effect
After Buyback Events, WHYY (Oct. 31, 2018), https://whyy.org/articles/delawares-bump-stockban-to-take-effect-after-buyback-events/ (detailing an initiative in Delaware where the state offered
to buy bump stocks and related devices from owners prior to, and in open anticipation of, banning
the devices).
212. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 43 S. Ct. 158, 160 (1922).
213. Id.
214. 963 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2020).
215. Id. at 360.
216. Id. at 366–67.
217. See supra Section IV.A.
218. See supra Section III.
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courts face when analyzing regulatory takings cases. 219 The Supreme Court
needs to revisit this area of law, abandon its use of categorical classifications,
and hold that real property and personal property be given the same weight
under the Takings Clause. 220 If the Supreme Court clarifies its Takings
Clause jurisprudence, cases like Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. could be decided
by lower courts in a more consistent manner. 221

219. See supra Section IV.B.
220. See supra Section IV.B; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Md. Shall Issue, Inc. v.
Hogan, (No. 20-855) (filed Dec. 21, 2020) (requesting that the United States Supreme Court clarify
its Takings Clause jurisprudence and overrule the decision of the Fourth Circuit). The Court denied
the petition for writ of certiorari on May 3, 2021. Md. Shall Issue, Inc. v. Hogan, No. 20-855, 2021
U.S. LEXIS 2303 at *1 (May 3, 2021).
221. See supra Section IV.C.

